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Abstract
International investment law balances public and private interests within the broader 
framework of international law. Consequently, when water supply services, which con-
stitute a public good, are privatized and operated by foreign investors, questions arise 
regarding whether foreign investors could be held responsible for the right to water 
under international law. This article considers how the tribunal in Urbaser v. Argentina 
allocated responsibility for compliance with the right to water between the host State 
and the foreign investor when resolving a dispute over privatized water services. It 
highlights how the tribunal in Urbaser v. Argentina supports different understandings 
of public and private based on whether the human rights obligation is framed in terms 
of the duty to respect or protect. The article argues that the tribunal’s rationale over-
complicates the process of allocating responsibility for violations of the human right 
to water when water supply services have been privatized.
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1 Introduction
International investment law (iil) blends concepts of public and private.1 The 
merger of these notions in iil is illustrated by some of the public/private in-
teractions that arise when water supply and sanitation services are privatized 
and operated by foreign investors. In this setting, privatization results in a pri-
vate foreign investor supplying the host State population with water, which 
traditionally constituted a public service.2 From a legal perspective, privati-
zation is governed by private obligations sourced from domestic law.3 Yet, a 
foreign investor’s private property rights are protected by principles of iil, 
which are sourced from public international law.4 As a result of the privatiza-
tion of water supply services, private foreign investors can effect whether the 
local population enjoys the human right to water;5 a right sourced from public 
international law.6 These intersections between public and private generate 
tensions within iil given the competing policy objectives underpinning each 
interaction.
The tensions that result from the various interactions between public and 
private crystallize when investment disputes arise over water supply and sani-
tation services. It lies with the investment tribunal to evaluate the degree to 
1 See Julie A. Maupin, ‘Public and Private in International Investment Law: An Integrated 
Systems Approach’, Virginia Journal of International Law, 54/2: 367–435 (2014); Alex Mills, 
‘Antinomies of Public and Private at the Foundations of International Investment Law and 
Arbitration’, Journal of International Economic Law, 14/2: 469–503 (2011).
2 Fernando Dias Simões, ‘The Erosion of the Concept of Public Service in Water Concessions: 
Evidence from Investor-State Arbitration’ in Julien Chaisse (ed.), The Regulation of the Global 
Water Services Market (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), p. 71.
3 Ibid., p. 79.
4 See José E. Alvarez, The Public International Law Regime Governing International Investment 
(The Hague: Hague Academy of International Law, 2011).
5 Markus Krajewski, ‘Protecting the Human Right to Water through the Regulation of Multina-
tional Enterprises’ in Julian Chaisse (ed.), The Regulation of the Global Water Services Market 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), p. 167.
6 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights does not contain an ex-
press right to water. However, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recog-
nized the right in General Comment No. 15; un Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (cescr), General Comment No. 15: The Right to Water (Arts. 11 and 12 of the Covenant), 
E/C.12/2002/1, 20 January 2003. See Paula Gerber and Bruce Chen, ‘Recognition of the Human 
Right to Water: Has the Tide Turned?’, Alternative Law Journal, 36/1: 21–26 (2011); Stephen 
Tully, ‘A Human Right to Access Water? A Critique of General Comment No. 15’, Netherlands 
Quarterly of Human Rights 23/1: 35–63 (2005).
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which public and private interests conflict and to reconcile the legal standards 
and frameworks that apply. Investment tribunals regularly resolve disputes by 
doing exactly this. However, investment tribunals frequently overlook the sig-
nificance of human rights obligations in disputes over water supply services,7 
and in so doing, fail to address a key public dimension of the dispute. The re-
luctance of investment tribunals to fully engage with the human right to water 
could be due to the distinct legal structure that governs human rights obli-
gations. Under the human rights framework, States have traditionally borne 
responsibility for compliance with human rights obligations.8 For economic, 
social and cultural rights, which include the right to water, this obligation has 
been further broken down by the  un Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (cescr) into obligations to respect, protect and fulfil.9 Hence, 
States must not interfere with the enjoyment of the right (the duty to respect),10 
give effect to and support the right by preventing third parties from infringing 
the right (the duty to protect)11 and take necessary action to ensure the right 
is enjoyed (the duty to fulfil).12 Under this framework, the State is ultimately 
responsible for all types of human rights violations, leaving little room for in-
vestment tribunals to hold private actors responsible for breaches of human 
rights standards. Nonetheless, when water supply and sanitation services have 
7 Tribunals have recognized the relevance of the right to water to disputes regarding water 
supply services, but have failed to fully address its significance. See, for example, saur In-
ternational s.a. v. Argentine Republic, icsid Case No. arb/04/4, Decision on Jurisdiction 
and Liability, 6 June 2012, paras. 330–331.
8 See Adam McBeth, International Economic Actors and Human Rights (Abingdon: Rout-
ledge, 2010), pp. 11–15.
9 The cescr has applied this framework since General Comment No. 12; cescr, General 
Comment No. 12: The Right to Adequate Food (Art. 11 of the Covenant), E/C.12/1999/5, 12 May 
1999.
10 Frédéric Mégret, ‘Nature of Obligations’ in Daniel Moeckli, Sangeeta Shah and Sandesh 
Sivakuraman (eds.), International Human Rights Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010), p. 130; Gilles Giacca, Christophe Golay, and Eibe Riedel, ‘The Development of Eco-
nomic, Social, and Cultural Rights in International Law’ in Eibe Riedel, Gilles Giacca, and 
Christophe Golay (eds.), Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in International Law: Con-
temporary Rights in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 18; Chris-
tian Tomuschat, Human Rights: Between Idealism and Realism (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2014), p. 142.
11 Mégret, supra note 10, pp. 130–131; Giacca, Golay, and Riedel, supra note 10, p. 19; Tomus-
chat, supra note 10, p. 142.
12 Mégret, supra note 10, p. 131; Giacca, Golay, and Riedel, supra note 10, p. 19; Tomuschat, 
supra note 10, p. 142.
Downloaded from Brill.com12/12/2018 04:26:23PM
via University of Sussex Library
Guntrip
brill open law 1 (2018) 37-60
<UN>
40
been privatized, the foreign investor plays an instrumental role in determining 
whether the host State population enjoys the right to water.13 Given that the 
foreign investor is so influential, there is discussion regarding whether foreign 
investors should be directly bound by human rights obligations. However, to 
implement this proposal, adjustments to the State-based respect, protect and 
fulfil framework would be required because it is not currently structured in a 
way that accommodates non-State actors as duty bearers.
Urbaser v. Argentina14 (Urbaser) is the most recent award to address an in-
vestment dispute regarding a privatized water supply and sanitation service. 
Significantly, it is the first award to directly examine the application of the hu-
man right to water to this type of dispute. As such, the Urbaser award provides 
an insight into how investment tribunals might address the public interest 
in the form of human rights obligations. The reasoning of the tribunal chal-
lenges the existing human rights structures to create a binding obligation for 
non-State actors to respect the right to water.15 This article argues that, when 
creating this obligation, the tribunal in Urbaser utilizes different understand-
ings of public and private based on whether the right to water is framed in 
terms of an obligation to respect or to protect. By taking this approach, the 
tribunal overcomplicates the process of allocating responsibility for compli-
ance with the human right to water in instances where water and sanitation 
services have been privatized. To establish this position, this article focuses its 
discussion around the process of privatization, which captures the blending 
of public and private in iil. It refers to the privatization of water supply and 
sanitation services to identify three understandings of public and private that 
apply in this context. The host State’s counterclaim in the Urbaser award is 
then analyzed from the perspective of how the tribunal manages to reconcile 
these three forms of public and private in its reasoning. This highlights how 
the tribunal applies contradictory understandings of public and private when 
addressing the obligations to respect and to protect respectively. The article 
then considers some of the implications of the distinction made by the tri-
bunal between the obligations to respect and to protect, with reference to the 
apportionment of international responsibility for compliance with the human 
right to water.
13 Krajewski, supra note 5, p. 167.
14 Urbaser s.a. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Biskaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v. Argen-
tine Republic, icsid Case No. arb/07/26, Award, 8 December 2016 (hereinafter  Urbaser v. 
Argentina).
15 Ibid., para. 1199.
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2 Privatization and Understandings of Public and Private
In general terms, privatization occurs when those who represent the pub-
lic sector transfer responsibility for certain activities from the public sector 
to the private sector.16 Privatization can take various forms:17 States can sell 
public assets outright; retain title to assets but cease to manage them; or lease 
control of public assets to private actors for a period of time.18 Consequently, 
what amounts to privatization in any given situation will differ.19 However, 
at its essence, privatization focuses on the legal relationship between public 
and private interests. In the context of privatized water supply and sanita-
tion services, there are three interactions between public and private that 
are relevant to understanding the Urbaser award. First, the status and role of 
each actor is examined with reference to how concession contracts are used 
to privatize public services. Second, public and private approaches to water 
are discussed in light of the philosophies that determine how water should 
be distributed. Finally, the protection of public and private legal interests are 
considered by analyzing the interrelationships between the applicable legal 
frameworks that govern privatized water supply services and the human right 
to water.
2.1 Concession Contracts
The dominant means of achieving privatization in the water sector is through 
the use of concession contracts.20 Concession contracts govern the legal rela-
tionship that arises when a State, as a public entity, transfers some of its public 
functions to a private actor, which in the context of iil is a foreign investor.21 
As such, concession contracts focus on the status and function of the actors in-
volved in the privatization process. The status and role of each actor provides 
the first iteration of how public and private can be understood in the context 
of privatized water supply services. Under most water concessions, the State 
retains legal ownership of the water supply and sanitation service, but the 
16 Lennart J. Lundqvist, ‘Privatization: Towards a Concept for Comparative Policy Analysis’, 
Journal of Public Policy, 8/1: 1–19 (1988), p. 12.
17 David Heald, ‘Privatisation: Analysing its Appeals and Limitations’, Fiscal Studies, 5/1: 
36–46 (1984), p. 45.
18 Khulekani Moyo, ‘Privatisation of the Commons: Water as a Right; Water as a Commod-
ity’, Stellenbosch Law Review, 22: 804–822 (2011), p. 812.
19 Ibid.; Lundqvist, supra note 16, p. 2.
20 Simões, supra note 2, p. 71.
21 Moyo, supra note 18, p. 812.
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private actor provides operational and managerial functions22 that generate 
income. As a result, private actors bear the financial risk.23 The State is usually 
responsible for billing customers and for undertaking some regulatory activi-
ties such as monitoring unfair trading and ensuring customer needs are met.24 
Consequently, the State’s involvement in the provision of the public service is 
significantly reduced,25 but it is not completely absolved of all responsibility in 
relation to the privatized water service. Therefore, concession contracts create 
a working distinction between the State as a public body and the foreign inves-
tor as a private actor. However, given the interrelated nature of the roles that 
each actor performs, concession contracts do not strictly delineate between 
the concepts of public and private.26
2.2 Access to Water
The privatization of water supply and sanitation services has given rise to 
competing philosophies regarding how water should be distributed. These op-
posing outlooks produce a second understanding of public and private. Water 
has traditionally been considered to be a public resource.27 By placing water 
supply and sanitation services under the control of the private sector, water 
becomes a commodity.28 This is because, under this structure, access to wa-
ter is usually based on the ability to pay, rather than being a freely accessible 
resource. When water is viewed as an asset, a private perspective is adopted. 
From one viewpoint, the private approach is beneficial because it provides an 
efficient means of distributing a limited resource.29 By requiring consumers 
22 Khulekani Moyo and Sandra Liebenberg, ‘The Privatization of Water Services: The Quest 
for Enhanced Water Rights Accountability’, Human Rights Quarterly, 37/3: 691–727 (2015), 
p. 695; Simões, supra note 2, p. 71.
23 Julien Chaisse and Marine Polo, ‘Globalization of Water Privatization: Ramifications of 
Investor-State Disputes in the “Blue-Gold” Economy’, Boston College International and 
Comparative Law Review, 38/1: 1–63 (2015), p. 8; Simões, supra note 2, p. 71.
24 Chaisse and Polo, supra note 22, p. 9.
25 Moyo and Leibenberg, supra note 22, p. 692.
26 Gillian E. Metzger, ‘Privatization as Delegation’, Columbia Law Review, 103/6: 1367–1502 
(2003), p. 1370.
27 Jennifer Naegele, ‘What is Wrong with Full-Fledged Water Privatization?’, Journal of Law 
and Social Challenges, 6: 99–130 (2004), p. 100.
28 Moyo, supra note 18, p. 812.
29 Craig Macklin and Carolan Mclarney, ‘Too Public Not To Be Private: Investigating Water 
Ownership as a Strategy in a World of Economic Goods Under International Trade and 
Investment Laws’, iup Journal of Business Strategy, 11/1: 7–22 (2014), p. 13; Naegele, supra 
note 27, p. 100; Fabrizio Marrella, ‘On the Changing Structure of International Investment 
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to pay market price for water, they will only use what they need, thereby con-
serving the resource.30 Further, private capital can expand water supply sys-
tems and thereby increase access to water,31 although, this may be at a greater 
expense for the recipient of the water.32 However, a market driven approach 
to water supply does not necessarily take into account equitable access to wa-
ter.33 Consequently, an alternative standpoint emphasizes the fundamental 
nature of water for human existence and does not view water as a commodity, 
but stresses equal access to water as a fundamental human right.34 Based on 
this understanding, water should be available to all regardless of cost.35 This 
position reflects a public perspective regarding access to water. In practice, the 
distinctions drawn between public and private approaches to access to water 
are not definitive.36 This is because both public and private stances operate in 
tandem to manage the tension that arises from water being a limited resource 
that also provides a fundamental human need. Nonetheless, the philosophies 
underpinning each viewpoint correlate with understandings of public and 
private.
2.3 Legal Framework
The legal framework that governs privatized water and sanitation services pro-
vides the third example of how the concepts of public and private interrelate. 
Legal systems can be classified in a variety of ways depending on what attri-
butes of the legal system are prioritized. Consequently, the analysis presented 
in this section provides only one limited perspective. Although the approach 
set out below is contestable, the interpretation put forward assists with under-
standing how the tribunal in Urbaser reached its conclusion.
Both domestic law and international law apply to privatized water supply 
and sanitation services. Concession contracts determine the relationship be-
tween the public and private sectors under domestic law by allocating respon-
sibilities between the foreign investor and the host State for the running of 
Law: The Human Right to Water and icsid Arbitration’, International Community Law 
Review, 12/3: 335–359 (2010), p. 336.
30 Naegele, supra note 27, p. 101.
31 Ibid., p. 107; Simões, supra note 2, p. 70.
32 Macklin and Mclarney, supra note 29, p. 14.
33 Naegele, supra note 27, p. 101; Moyo, supra note 18, p. 814.
34 See cescr, General Comment No. 15, supra note 6, para. 2. Naegele, supra note 27, p. 101; 
Moyo, supra note 18, p. 805; Marrella, supra note 29, p. 336.
35 Macklin and Mclarney, supra note 29, p. 9.
36 Bronwyn Morgen, Water on Tap: Rights and Regulations in the Transnational Governance 
of Urban Water Services (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 2.
Downloaded from Brill.com12/12/2018 04:26:23PM
via University of Sussex Library
Guntrip
brill open law 1 (2018) 37-60
<UN>
44
the privatized water supply and sanitation service.37 By conferring the foreign 
investor with rights and obligations, the domestic contract creates private legal 
interests. At the international level, the foreign investor’s property rights asso-
ciated with the privatized water supply, which potentially include rights con-
tained in the concession contract, are protected by international investment 
agreements (iias) and customary iil.38 Thus, although iil binds States, it also 
supports the private aspects of the legal relationship between the State and the 
foreign investor. A tension arises within this framework, because whilst both 
concession contracts and iil seek to protect private rights, they use private, 
domestic law and public international law respectively to achieve this aim.
This position can be contrasted with the law governing the right to water, 
which can be classified as being solely public in nature. This is because, in part, 
the right to water promotes the idea of access to water for all.39 However, in 
addition, the right to water is sourced from international human rights law 
and only binds States.40 As foreign investors lack international legal personal-
ity, in accordance with traditional understandings of public international law, 
they cannot owe obligations under international law.41 Hence, States retain the 
legal obligation in public international law to ensure that the human right to 
water is fulfilled even though the private actor is providing the water supply 
service.42 Non-binding soft law instruments such as the Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights43 and voluntary initiatives such as the un Global 
Compact,44 have sought to encourage private corporate bodies (including for-
eign investors) to comply with obligations sourced from international human 
rights law in the absence of binding legal obligations.45
37 Simões, supra note 2, p. 71.
38 Ursula Kriebaum, ‘Privatising Human Rights: The Interface between International In-
vestment Protection and Human Rights’ in August Reinisch and Ursula Kriebaum (eds.), 
The Law of International Relations – Liber Amicorum Hanspeter Neuhold (Utrecht: Eleven 
 International Publishing, 2007), p. 186; Morgen, supra note 36, p. 175.
39 See cescr, General Comment No. 15, supra note 6, para. 2.
40 Markos Karavias, ‘Shared Responsibility and Multinational Enterprises’, Netherlands 
 International Law Review, 62: 91–117 (2015), p. 101.
41 Naegele, supra note 27, p. 118.
42 Moyo, supra note 18, p. 818; Kriebaum, supra note 38, p. 166.
43 Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework, 
hr/pub/11/04, January 2012.
44 un Global Compact, http://www.unglobalcompact.org.uk, accessed 10 April 2018.
45 See Nadia Bernaz, Business and Human Rights: History, Law and Policy – Bridging the Ac-
countability Gap (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), pp. 163–203.
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There is very little intersection between the domestic and international le-
gal frameworks that address the public and private aspects of privatized water 
supply services. Concession contracts are governed by domestic law and rarely 
refer to international obligations46 and international human rights law does 
not directly address private actors. Further, iias seldom fully set out how in-
vestment protection standards interrelate with legal obligations sourced from 
other regimes in international law.47 Therefore, the right to water is protected 
on the international plane, but it operates independently of the concession 
contract, any applicable iia and customary iil. Hence, neither the domestic 
or international legal planes enable both public and private interests to be 
accommodated in the context of privatized water supply services. This legal 
framework creates an unusual position for both foreign investors and States 
when addressing the public aspects of privatized water supply services be-
cause ‘foreign private investors found themselves involved in activities with a 
clear impact on human rights obligations incumbent upon States. Conversely, 
States overlooked the fact that by privatizing certain essential services there 
would have been no transfer of international responsibility in terms of human 
rights obligations.’48
Consequently, there are different understandings of public and private in 
the legal framework governing privatized water supply and sanitation services. 
Private interests are set out in domestic law in the form of concession contracts 
and are supported by iil. As iil relies on public international law to protect 
private interests, notions of public and private converge. Law that seeks to pro-
tect public goods, such as water, usually operates on the international plane. 
There is a disconnect between public and private within this legal framework 
as the law that seeks to protect private interests rarely operates in conjunction 
with the law that seeks to protect public interests, either on the international 
plane, or between the applicable domestic and international legal frameworks.
2.4 Preliminary Conclusion
In short, privatizing water supply and sanitation services in the context of iil 
generates multiple understandings of the concepts of public and private. This 
section has drawn attention to three conceptualizations. These relate to the 
status of the actors involved, the basis on which water is allocated and the legal 
46 Eric de Brabandere, Investment Treaty Arbitration as Public International Law: Procedural 
Aspects and Implications (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 30.
47 A rare exception is Article 18 of the Morocco-Nigeria Bilateral Investment Treaty (not yet 
in force) that sets out human rights obligations for foreign investors.
48 Marrella, supra note 29, p. 348.
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frameworks that govern these relationships. Although not definitive, the clas-
sifications discussed above illustrate the tensions that the tribunal in Urbaser 
was attempting to resolve. As such, they provide a useful frame of reference for 
analyzing the Urbaser award.
3 The Counterclaim in Urbaser v. Argentina
The Urbaser award is the latest investment award to address a dispute over 
privatized water supply services.49 The claimant in the dispute was a share-
holder in a corporate concessionaire that supplied water and sewerage ser-
vices in Buenos Aires.50 Following Argentina’s financial crisis in 2001–2, Argen-
tina enacted emergency measures that exacerbated the concession’s financial 
difficulties.51 After the concessionaire had become insolvent, the claimant 
commenced arbitral proceedings against Argentina for violations of the Spain-
Argentina bilateral investment treaty (Spain-Argentina bit).52 Argentina 
counterclaimed, based on the concessionaire’s failure to provide the necessary 
level of investment in the concession, which it claimed, led to violations of the 
human right to water.53
Argentina’s counterclaim is particularly instructive with regards to how 
the tribunal understands the intersections between public and private in the 
context of privatized water supply and sanitation services. This is because the 
tribunal’s discussion of the counterclaim directly addresses how the right to 
water applies to foreign investors who operate privatized water supply servic-
es. The tribunal’s analysis in relation to the counterclaim proceeds in three 
stages. First, it discusses the general human rights obligations of corporations. 
Second, it considers the legal obligations associated with the human right to 
49 Previous awards include saur International s.a. v. Argentine Republic, icsid Case No. 
arb/04/4, Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability, 6 June 2012; Azurix Corp. v. Argentine 
Republic, icsid Case No. arb/01/12, Award, 14 July 2006 (and annulment proceedings, 
Azurix Corp. v. the Argentine Republic, icsid Case No. arb/01/12, Decision on the Applica-
tion for Annulment of the Argentine Republic, 1 September 2009); Suez, Sociedad General 
de Aguas de Barcelona s.a. and Interagua Servicios Integrales de Agua s.a. v. Argentine 
Republic, icsid Case No. arb/03/17, Decision on Liability, 30 July 2010; and Suez, Sociedad 
General de Aguas de Barcelona s.a. and Vivendi Universal S.A v. Argentine Republic, icsid 
Case No. arb/03/19, Decision on Liability, 30 July 2010.
50 Urbaser v. Argentina, para. 34.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid., para. 35.
53 Ibid., paras. 36–37.
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water. Finally, it examines the legal relationship between the foreign investor 
and Argentina to determine whether these obligations bind the claimant in 
this case.
3.1 Human Rights Obligations and Corporations
At the commencement of its analysis, the tribunal immediately opposes the 
contention that ‘guaranteeing the human right to water is a duty that may 
be born solely by the State’.54 In so doing, the tribunal rejects the notion that 
 corporations are not subjects of international law on the basis that such a prin-
ciple ‘has lost its impact and relevance’.55 With indirect reference to the  Ruggie 
Report,56 the tribunal explains that corporate social responsibility requires 
corporations to conduct their operations in a manner that complies with hu-
man rights.57 The tribunal acknowledges that, whilst corporations are not im-
mune from becoming subjects of international law, this does not necessarily 
result in the creation of human rights obligations that directly bind corporate 
bodies.58 To ensure that companies are subject to appropriate obligations ‘the 
focus must be, therefore, on contextualizing a corporation’s specific activities 
as they relate to the human right at issue in order to determine whether any 
international law obligations attach to the non-State individual’.59
In the first stage of the tribunal’s reasoning, focus is placed on the actors in-
volved in privatized water supply services and the legal framework that applies 
to them. By identifying that the fulfilment of the human right to water is not 
solely an obligation of the State, the tribunal indicates that public internation-
al law has the potential to bind foreign investors in addition to States. By taking 
this position, the tribunal disregards the traditional view that non-State actors 
are only governed by domestic law and States by public international law.60 
As such, the tribunal blends understandings of public and private.  Merging 
54 Ibid., para. 1193.
55 Ibid., para. 1194.
56 un Human Rights Council, Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and 
Human Rights: Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of 
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, John Rug-
gie, a/hrc/8/5, 7 April 2008.
57 Urbaser v. Argentina, para. 1195.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 Cedric Ryngaert, ‘Imposing International Duties on Non-State Actors and the Legitimacy 
of International Law’ in Math Noortmann and Cedric Ryngaert (eds.), Non-State Actor 
Dynamics in International Law: From Law-Takers to Law-Makers (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2010), p. 78.
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public and private in this way is contrary to the position that international hu-
man rights law only binds States, and consequently, fundamentally alters how 
international human rights law functions.
3.2 Corporations and the Right to Water
In the second phase, to contextualize the obligations of the corporate foreign 
investor, the tribunal examined the nature of obligations relating to the human 
right to water. Based on the terminology adopted in the Universal Declaration 
on Human Rights (udhr),61 the tribunal acknowledged that individuals are 
not bound by its terms, but for the udhr to be effective, individuals must con-
tribute to the fulfilment of the obligations contained in the udhr.62 These ob-
ligations include the right to equal access to public service (Article 21(2) udhr) 
and the right to a standard of living adequate for health and well-being (Article 
25(1) udhr), both of which the tribunal deems are capable of encompassing 
access to a clean, public water supply.63 The tribunal additionally drew support 
for the view that non-State actors contribute to human rights compliance from 
Article 5(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights64 (icescr).65 This provision precludes rights contained in the icescr 
from being interpreted in a manner that permits States and non-State actors 
to destroy or limit other rights set out in the icescr. The tribunal referred to 
General Comment No. 15 of cescr to support the position that the icescr 
encompasses the right to water.66 Further support for the right to water was 
drawn from the United Nations’ General Assembly Resolution 64/292.67 Final-
ly, the tribunal referred to the requirement that corporations respect the udhr 
and the icescr, which it sourced from Article 8 of the International Labor 
 Office’s Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multilateral Enterprises 
and Social Policy (of 1977, as amended in 2006).68 Based on these  instruments, 
61 217 a(iii), 10 December 1948 (udhr).
62 Urbaser v. Argentina, para. 1196.
63 Ibid.
64 1976 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (icsecr) (signed 16 
December 1966; entered into force 3 January 1976), unts 993: 3.
65 Urbaser v. Argentina, para. 1197.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.; a/res/64/292, 3 August 2010.
68 Urbaser v. Argentina, para. 1198; ilo, ‘Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning 
Multilateral Enterprises and Social Policy’, adopted by the Governing Body of the Inter-
national Labour Office at its 204th Session, http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/-
--ed_emp/---emp_ent/---multi/documents/publication/wcms_094386.pdf, accessed 10 
April 2018. This version includes the March 2017 updates.
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the tribunal found that in addition to human rights giving effect to the right to 
water, there was also ‘an obligation on all parts, public and private parties, not 
to engage in activity aimed at destroying such rights’.69
In its second stage of analysis, the tribunal introduces a binding legal obli-
gation for non-State actors in relation to the right to water. By focusing on not 
destroying the enjoyment of the right to water, the foreign investor’s obliga-
tion is framed in terms that mirror the State obligation to respect the human 
right to water70 (which continues to apply). The foreign investor’s obligation to 
respect the right to water emphasizes water as a public good that satisfies a hu-
man need. This operates in addition to the private understanding of water as a 
commodity, which the foreign investor is already bound by under the conces-
sion contract. Thus, the tribunal merges the public viewpoint on access to wa-
ter with a private approach, thereby requiring the foreign investor to balance 
both philosophies that underlie the debate over access to water. To achieve this 
result, the tribunal bridged the domestic and international legal frameworks. 
The tribunal found textual foundations in the relevant international instru-
ments that permit international obligations to directly bind non-State actors, 
such as foreign investors. The tribunal’s conclusion is controversial, as Article 
5(1) icescr does not create substantive obligations for parties to the icescr.71 
Further, Article 21(2) udhr is commonly understood as referring to the right to 
equal employment opportunities within a State’s public or civil service,72 rath-
er than relating to the provision of public services such as water supply and 
sanitation services. Hence, the tribunal prioritizes public approaches to ac-
cess to water and undertakes an unorthodox analysis of the legal  instruments 
69 Urbaser v. Argentina, para. 1199.
70 See Anil Yilmaz-Vastardis, ‘Is International Investment Law moving the ball forward on 
ihrl obligations for business enterprises?’, ejil Talk!, 15 May 2017, https://www.ejiltalk.
org/is-international-investment-law-moving-the-ball-forward-on-ihrl-obligations-for 
-business-enterprises/, accessed 10 April 2018.
71 For discussion regarding the use of Article 5(1) icescr in this way, see Edward Guntrip, 
‘Urbaser v Argentina: The Origins of a Host State Human Rights Counterclaim in icsid 
Arbitration?’ ejil Talk!, 10 February 2017, https://www.ejiltalk.org/urbaser-v-argentina 
-the-origins-of-a-host-state-human-rights-counterclaim-in-icsid-arbitration/, accessed 10 
April 2018.
72 See un Human Rights Committee (hrc), ccpr General Comment No. 25: Article 25 (Par-
ticipation in Public Affairs and the Right to Vote), The Right to Participate in Public Affairs, 
Voting Rights and the Right of Equal Access to Public Service, ccpr/c/21/Rev.1/Add.7, 12 
July 1996, para. 23, which addresses Article 25(c) of the 1966 International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (signed 16 December 1966; entered into force 23 March 1976) 
unts 999: 171, which is phrased in similar terms to Article 21(2) of the udhr.
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regulating public and private interests. In so doing, it merges public and pri-
vate, with the result that, in addition to the State, the foreign investor is legally 
bound by the duty to respect the right to water.
3.3 Corporate Obligations and the Claimant
Finally, having determined that the Spain-Argentina bit and the Washington 
Convention73 permitted reference to international human rights law,74 the 
tribunal proceeded to examine the specific nature of the foreign investor’s 
obligation in this instance. Whilst recognizing the right to water as part of in-
ternational human rights law,75 the tribunal proceeded to consider whether 
this human right amounted to a binding legal obligation on the claimant. The 
tribunal referred to how Argentina constructed its counterclaim, and in par-
ticular, the failure of Argentina to specify the precise legal foundation of the 
foreign investor’s obligation other than the general performance of the con-
cession contract.76 This was problematic because ‘the human right to water 
entails an obligation of compliance on the part of the State, but it does not 
contain an obligation for performance on part of any company providing the 
contractually required service’.77
The source of the foreign investor’s alleged legal obligation underpins the 
tribunal’s reasoning from this point. The tribunal deems that, for obligations 
based on the human right to water to apply to a company, a contractual or com-
mercial legal relationship is required.78 This is to be sourced from domestic law 
and not general international law.79 In the absence of any obligation on the for-
eign investor, and Argentina’s involvement in the regulation of the water supply, 
Argentina bore responsibility for complying with the human right to water.80
In the final stage of the tribunal’s discussion of Argentina’s counterclaim, 
the tribunal continues to address the right to water, but emphasizes a separate 
aspect of the right. The use of language such as ‘performance’ stresses an ob-
ligation to give effect to the right, thereby framing this discussion in terms of 
the obligation to protect.81 The tribunal’s position during the third stage of its 
73 1966 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals 
of Other States (signed 18 March 1965; entered into force 14 October 1966), unts 575: 159.
74 Urbaser v. Argentina, paras. 1201–1203.
75 Ibid., para. 1205.
76 Ibid., para. 1206.
77 Ibid., para. 1208.
78 Ibid., para. 1210.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid., para. 1213.
81 See Yilmaz-Vastardis, supra note 70.
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analysis is clearly influenced by both its jurisdictional limits and the manner 
in which Argentina formulated the terms of its counterclaim. Nonetheless, the 
tribunal takes the opposite stance to that outlined in relation to the obligation 
to respect. This is evidenced by how the tribunal applies the concepts of pub-
lic and private in this section of its award. When discussing the obligation to 
protect, the tribunal stresses that only States are bound by obligations sourced 
in public international law and requires the human right to water be incorpo-
rated into contractual terms, or domestic law provisions, in order for it to bind 
foreign investors.82 Thus, the tribunal views the foreign investor as a private 
actor that can only be regulated by private, domestic law and States as public 
actors that can only be regulated by public international law. This is in contrast 
to the second stage of the tribunal’s discussion, where it found a textual basis 
for bridging the private and public aspects of the same legal framework.
By distinguishing between the public and private aspects of the legal frame-
work when addressing the obligation to protect, the tribunal also segregates 
public and private understandings relating to access to water. The foreign in-
vestor continues to operate under the private framework of the concession 
contract where water is a commodity. However, as the foreign investor is not 
bound by a direct obligation under international law to protect the right to wa-
ter, enabling access to water in the form of a public good remains the sole re-
sponsibility of the State. This position contrasts with the obligation to respect 
where the foreign investor must balance the public and private justifications 
underpinning access to water.
When the obligations to respect and to protect are analyzed by reference to 
the conceptualizations of public and private outlined in the section above, it 
becomes clear that the tribunal in Urbaser views the nature of these obliga-
tions very differently. The obligation to respect the right to water is binding on 
States and foreign investors regardless of the legal framework that governs the 
privatization relationship or any distinction that is drawn between public and 
private. In contrast, the duty to protect binds States under international law, 
but whether it additionally binds foreign investors depends on whether the 
legal obligation can be sourced from domestic law. In taking this stance, the 
tribunal clearly separates public and private.
3.4 Preliminary Conclusion
In conclusion, the Urbaser award utilizes three understandings of public and 
private that arise when water supply and sanitation services are privatized by 
foreign investors. These conceptions are based on the actors involved in the 
82 Urbaser v. Argentina, para. 1210.
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privatization process, the basis on which water should be distributed and the 
legal framework that governs privatized water supply services. When address-
ing whether corporate foreign investors could be bound by international law, 
and establishing that there was a duty on States and foreign investors to respect 
(i.e. not destroy) the human right to water, the tribunal merged all three con-
cepts of public and private. However, when discussing the duty to protect (i.e. 
to give effect to) the human right to water, the tribunal reverted to traditional 
understandings and legal frameworks that distinguish between public and pri-
vate. By taking varied approaches based on whether the obligation is to respect 
or to protect, and allocating differentiated duties to States and non-State actors 
accordingly, the tribunal raises questions regarding the allocation of interna-
tional responsibility for the human right to water when water and sanitation 
services have been privatized and are operated by foreign investors.
4 International Responsibility for the Human Right to Water
The Urbaser award holds different actors responsible for compliance with the 
right to water under international law based on whether the obligation is to 
respect or to protect. In relation to the obligation to protect (i.e. to give effect 
to) the right to water, the State is responsible under international law and must 
use domestic legal frameworks to transfer responsibilities to a foreign investor. 
This structure aligns with classic understandings of how international human 
rights law should be implemented.83 With regards to the obligation to respect 
(i.e. not destroy) the right to water, the tribunal finds that the host State and 
the foreign investor may both be held responsible under international law for 
conduct that destroys enjoyment of the right to water. This framework does 
not conform to traditional understandings of how international human rights 
law functions, and as such, raises questions regarding the workability of this 
distinction. The implications of the Urbaser award adopting divergent ap-
proaches to the obligations to respect and to protect the right to water will be 
analyzed, first, by reference to the tribunal’s use of the respect, protect and fulfil 
framework to establish these differentiated obligations, and second, by con-
sidering how a foreign investor can be found responsible within the existing 
State-based respect, protect and fulfil framework. Throughout this discussion, 
focus is placed on the international responsibility of the foreign investor as it is 
this form of responsibility that is contentious.
83 This forms part of the State’s duty to protect.
Downloaded from Brill.com12/12/2018 04:26:23PM
via University of Sussex Library
 53An Analysis of Urbaser v. Argentina
brill open law 1 (2018) 37-60
<UN>
4.1 Allocating Responsibility between States and Non-State Actors
The Urbaser award draws a crucial distinction between obligations to respect 
the right to water and obligations to protect the same right. The classification 
of the obligation determines whether a foreign investor can be held to be in-
ternationally responsible for compliance with the right to water. The Urbaser 
tribunal’s allocation of responsibility between States and non-State actors 
based on obligations to respect and protect can be justified, to a certain ex-
tent, by reference to the degree of influence that States and non-States actors 
are able to exert over other actors. International human rights law classically 
binds States because they possess the power to violate human rights.84 The 
obligation to respect requires States to refrain from using their power to breach 
human rights standards. As a corollary, States also have the power to prevent 
third parties from committing human rights violations.85 States can exercise 
this power by, for example, enacting domestic legislation to regulate conduct 
within their territory.86 As the State is conferred with the power required to 
bind others, the obligation to protect is most effectively performed by the State. 
Therefore, States are able to comply with the duties to respect and to protect. 
In contrast, non-State actors’ powers are primarily limited to controlling their 
own conduct (which includes their business relations).87 As such, any obliga-
tion imposed upon non-State actors should focus on ensuring that their indi-
vidual conduct is in compliance with human rights standards. In this regard, 
the most appropriate obligation for a non-State actor is one that mirrors the 
State’s duty to respect. This model has been employed in soft law instruments 
such as the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.88 Therefore, the 
tribunal in Urbaser assigns the most pertinent obligations to each actor from 
the perspective of their respective spheres of influence.
However, there is a significant difference between seeking to maximize 
compliance with human rights obligations by targeting the powers of specific 
84 Andrew Fagan, Human Rights: Confronting Myths and Misunderstandings (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2009), p. 91.
85 Biagio Zammitto, ‘The Duty to Protect Against Human Rights Violations Committed 
Abroad by Transnational Corporations and their Subsidiaries’ in Derrick M Nault and 
Shawn L England (eds.), Globalisation and Human Rights in the Developing World (Basing-
stoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 133.
86 Ibid.
87 Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights, supra note 43, Commentary to Principle 13.
88 Ibid., Parts i and ii. See Justine Nolan, ‘Refining the Rules of the Game: The Corporate 
Responsibility to Respect Human Rights’, Utrecht Journal of International and European 
Law, 30: 7–23 (2014), p. 7.
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actors, and allocating differentiated responsibilities for human rights viola-
tions based on the respect, protect and fulfil framework.89 The respect, protect 
and fulfil framework presumes that States are responsible for compliance with 
human rights standards, and thus, it was not intended as a means of allocat-
ing responsibility between various actors. Although drawn from two sources,90 
the creation of the respect, protect and fulfil framework had the common aim 
of capturing all forms of State conduct that are necessary to comply with a 
human right.91 The cescr has subsequently endorsed and applied the frame-
work to give effect to this intention.92 Altering the function of the respect, 
protect and fulfil framework to allocate responsibility between States and non-
State actors gives rise to several complications. In light of the framework’s in-
tended function, there was no need to clearly delineate between the obliga-
tions to respect, protect and fulfil. Conduct within this framework operates on 
a continuum93 and cannot readily be divided into clearly defined categories.94 
Further, negatively phrased human rights obligations may require positive ac-
tion to be taken in order to comply with the right.95 Therefore, whether action 
is classified as breaching either the obligation to respect or to protect is likely 
to depend on how the action is portrayed. For example, in the Urbaser dispute, 
it was alleged that the concessionaire had failed to adequately invest in the 
water and sanitation service.96 If this had been established, the failure to invest 
could be seen as a violation of both the obligation to respect and the obliga-
tion to protect. By failing to maintain a water supply service, the concessionaire 
would be preventing the local population from accessing water by its failure 
89 Olivier de Schutter, International Human Rights Law: Cases, Material and Commentary 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 248.
90 Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence and us Foreign Policy (Princeton n.j.: 
Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 52; Asbjørn Eide, The Right to Adequate Food as a Hu-
man Right, e/cn.4/Sub.2/1987/23, 7 July 1987.
91 Shue, supra note 90, p. 52; Eide, supra note 90.
92 This framework was first endorsed in cescr General Comment No. 12, supra note 9. Most 
recently, the model has been applied in cescr, General Comment No. 24: State obligations 
under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Context of 
Business Activities, e/c.12/gc/24, 10 August 2017.
93 Olivier de Schutter, ‘Corporations and Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights’ in Eibe 
 Riedel, Gilles Giacca, and Christophe Golay (eds.), Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in 
International Law: Contemporary Rights in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2014), p. 201.
94 Mégret, supra note 10, p. 132; Giacca, Golay, and Riedel, supra note 10, p. 20.
95 Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Paradigms of International Human Rights Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2016), pp. 222–223; de Schutter, supra note 93, p. 202.
96 Urbaser v. Argentina, para. 36.
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to act, thereby destroying the host State population’s enjoyment of this right. 
By framing the foreign investor’s conduct in this manner, it could be seen as 
violating the obligation to respect. To remedy this position, the concessionaire 
would have to take positive steps by investing further in the water supply ser-
vice, despite the right being formulated in negative terms. This type of positive 
action could be perceived as being more closely linked to the obligation to pro-
tect. On the other hand, the same conduct could be viewed from the perspec-
tive that the host State had not taken sufficient action to ensure that the right 
of the local population to water was not being damaged or destroyed by the 
concessionaire. If framed in these terms, the insufficient level of investment 
would be classified as the State’s failure to protect the human right to water. In 
both scenarios the concessionaire had failed to take the same measures to en-
sure access to water. Based on the distinction drawn by the tribunal in Urbaser, 
the concessionaire would be liable if this conduct was framed in terms of the 
obligation to respect. However, if framed in terms of the obligation to protect, 
the concessionaire would not be responsible under the international human 
rights law framework. Given that conduct may simultaneously be construed as 
breaches of either the obligation to respect or protect, the distinction drawn in 
the Urbaser award between these types of obligations does not provide a work-
able foundation for allocating responsibility between States and non-State ac-
tors for human rights violations.
4.2 The International Responsibility of a Foreign Investor
The Urbaser award formulates a binding legal obligation on both States and 
foreign investors to respect the right to water. For States, the obligation to re-
spect forms part of their pre-existing international obligations in relation to 
the right to water, which can be given effect to by using the international hu-
man rights law framework. However, given the State-based structure of inter-
national human rights law, it is not clear how a right holder can enforce the 
foreign investor’s international responsibility.
A human rights obligation is only effective if there is a forum in which the 
right holder can enforce the right.97 If the host State breaches its obligation to 
respect the right to water, existing human rights mechanisms will be available 
to the right holder. In general terms, for an individual to claim against a State, 
it will be necessary to exhaust local remedies,98 which usually requires that 
97 Anne Peters, Beyond Human Rights: The Legal Status of the Individual in International Law, 
trans. Jonathan Huston (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), p. 495.
98 Dinah Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2015), p. 90.
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an action is heard by the domestic courts of the perpetrating State. However, 
in the event that local remedies fail, or prove to be inadequate,99 depending 
on the circumstances, a claim could be raised before a regional human rights 
court100 or an individual complaint could be lodged with the relevant treaty 
body (or treaty bodies).101 The availability and effectiveness of the remedies 
available in each fora will vary. Nonetheless, multiple fora exist that can po-
tentially provide some redress for the victims of the human rights violation 
committed by a host State.
In contrast, there are limited fora in which rights holders can pursue a claim 
against a foreign investor for breaching the duty to respect the right to water. 
International bodies, such as regional human rights courts and treaty bod-
ies, are structured so as to only permit claims against States.102 Consequently, 
rights holders can only seek recourse against the foreign investor in domestic 
courts. The jurisdiction of the domestic court would only extend to human 
rights that have been implemented at a domestic level by the State.103 As some 
States only permit human rights claims to be brought against public bodies,104 
the status of the foreign investor may preclude the claim. In the event that 
domestic remedies against the foreign investor fail, or prove to be inadequate, 
an independent claim would have to be made against the State for its failure 
to protect the right to water in accordance with the existing human rights 
framework.105 This claim, based on the failure of the State’s judicial processes 
to remedy the breach, would rely on the same obligation to protect that could 
have been initially brought against the State for not regulating the acts of the 
foreign investor. Consequently, by creating a binding obligation on the foreign 
investor to respect the right to water, but failing to recognize the limited fora in 
which claims can be commenced from the perspective of the right holder, the 
tribunal in Urbaser has immediately diminished the effectiveness of confer-
ring international responsibility on the foreign investor.
99 Ibid., p. 92.
100 Ibid., p. 67.
101 Ibid., p. 193.
102 Naegele, supra note 27, p. 118; Kriebaum, supra note 38, p. 186; Jean d’Aspremont, Andrè 
Nollkaemper, Ilias Plakokefalos and Cedric Ryngaert, ‘Sharing Responsibility Between 
Non-State Actors and States in International Law: Introduction’, Netherlands Internation-
al Law Review, 62: 49–67 (2015), p. 55.
103 Peters, supra note 97, p. 503.
104 For example, sections 6 and 7 of The Human Rights Act 1998 (uk) only permit claims 
against acts of public bodies.
105 See Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade, The Access of Individuals to International Justice 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 99–100.
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The right holder will need to find the foreign investor responsible in accor-
dance with international law. States can be held responsible in international 
law when conduct that constitutes a breach of a binding international obliga-
tion can be attributed to them.106 The circumstances in which conduct will be 
attributed to a State are governed by the customary international law princi-
ples of State responsibility, which are commonly understood as being codified 
in the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
(arsiwa).107 This framework relies on secondary rules of international law to 
attribute conduct to States, whilst any determination regarding violations of 
binding international legal obligations is undertaken with reference to the pri-
mary laws that create the substantive obligations.108 arsiwa does permit cor-
porate conduct to be attributed to the State,109 but there is no equivalent law 
to arsiwa that addresses the international responsibility of corporations.110 
Although arsiwa is not directly applicable to foreign investors, it could be 
argued to apply by way of analogy. As the Urbaser award confers a directly 
binding obligation to respect the human right to water on foreign investors, it 
is arguable that they are conferred with limited international legal personality, 
coterminous with this obligation.111 If international legal personality is under-
stood as functioning in this way, this may permit the principles of arsiwa to 
be translated to address corporate conduct where a directly binding human 
rights obligation exists.112 However, at this point, this conclusion remains spec-
ulative. Guidance could also be drawn with other fields of international law. 
The only other field of international law where non-state actors can be found 
responsible is in the context of international criminal law. Given the serious-
ness of international crimes, and the different objectives of this regime, it is 
unlikely that principles governing responsibility in international criminal law 
would translate to the context of foreign investors breaching their obligation 
to respect the right to water. Thus, it remains unclear to what extent principles 
that attribute conduct to States, or principles used to confer responsibility in 
106 International Law Commission (ilc), Articles on Responsibility of States for Internation-
ally Wrongful Acts A/56/10, Article 2 (hereinafter ilc, arsiwa).
107 ilc, arsiwa, supra note 106, General Commentary, para. 1; James Crawford, State Respon-
sibility: The General Part (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 43.
108 ilc, arsiwa, supra note 106, General Commentary, para. 1.
109 See cescr, General Comment No. 24, supra note 92, para. 11.
110 James Crawford and Simon Olleson, ‘The Character and Forms of International Responsi-
bility’ in Malcolm Evans (ed.), International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 
p. 445.
111 Karavias, supra note 40, pp. 100–102.
112 Ibid., p. 102.
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international criminal law, could be translated to situations where foreign in-
vestors have breached their duty to respect the human right to water.113 Conse-
quently, the circumstances in which a foreign investor could be found respon-
sible for violating the duty to respect the right to water are currently unknown.
This section, so far, has presumed that the foreign investor will be held solely 
responsible for a breach of the duty to respect the right to water. However, it is 
possible that a foreign investor’s conduct may breach the obligation to respect 
the right to water as a result of the host State’s failure to adequately protect this 
right, giving rise to shared responsibility (and potential dual liability).114 For 
example, a foreign investor could fail to respect the right to water because the 
host State has neglected to protect the right by not including a human rights 
clause in the concession contract (or has not given effect to the right to water 
in its domestic legal provisions). Should both actors be found liable for their 
respective breaches, responsibility would need to be apportioned between the 
parties. It is unclear what principles would form the foundation for any appor-
tionment between a State and a non-State actor for human rights violations 
on the international legal plane.115 How responsibility is allocated may, in part, 
depend on the legal principles used to find the foreign investor responsible 
in the first place. Should arsiwa be capable of being translated to corporate 
bodies, concepts such as aiding and abetting, found in Article 16 arsiwa may 
prove useful.116 However, this would require a significant contribution to the 
breach by the foreign investor.117 Whether this could be established would 
depend on the facts of each claim. Nevertheless, the potential application of 
arsiwa presumes that the claims against the foreign investor and the host 
State would be heard in the same forum. As two separate claims will have been 
made against the foreign investor and the State, these may be heard in dif-
ferent fora. Therefore, two separate decision-making bodies may have to in-
dependently make this determination.118 Consequently, there is the potential 
for fragmented and inconsistent decision-making.119 This could undermine the 
113 See d’Aspremont, Nollkaemper, Plakokefalos and Ryngaert, supra note 102, p. 61.
114 See André Nollkaemper and Dov Jacobs, ‘Shared Responsibility in International Law: A 
Conceptual Framework’, Michigan Journal of International Law, 34/2: 359–438 (2013).
115 See d’Aspremont, Nollkaemper, Plakokefalos and Ryngaert, supra note 102, p. 55.
116 Karavias, supra note 40, pp. 102–103; James D. Fry, ‘Attribution of Responsibility’ in André 
Nollkaemper, Ilias Plakokefalos and Jessica Schechinger (eds) Principles of Shared Respon-
sibility in International Law: an Appraisal of the State of the Art (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014) pp. 116–117.
117 Karavias, supra note 40, p. 103.
118 Ibid., p. 105.
119 Ibid., p. 107.
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process of  allocating responsibility between the parties, and if claims are not 
co-ordinated, might give rise to additional disputes regarding how to resolve 
conflicting decisions regarding the apportionment of responsibility.120
All of the factors identified above generate multiple variables that those 
seeking redress for a human rights violation will need to navigate. Given the 
severe consequences of any violation of the right to water, there is the need 
for an effective remedy.121 By introducing a new actor into State-based human 
rights structures, the Urbaser tribunal has overcomplicated the processes of 
determining responsibility for violations of the right to water, which in turn, 
may preclude victims of human rights violations from being able to access a 
fast and effective remedy.
4.3 Preliminary Conclusion
The tribunal in Urbaser distinguishes between the obligations to respect and to 
protect in relation to the right to water and allocates responsibilities to States 
and foreign investors accordingly. Using the respect, protect and fulfil frame-
work to assign responsibility for human rights is problematic as this framework 
was not intended to perform this function and does not permit the actions of 
States and non-State actors to be easily categorized. Further, seeking to enforce 
the duty to respect the right to water against a foreign investor creates difficul-
ties for the right holder. They must identify an appropriate forum in which to 
bring a claim, determine the legal foundations for assigning responsibility to 
the foreign investor and resolve potential issues of shared responsibility and 
dual liability. By creating these legal challenges, the Urbaser award means that 
right holders are less likely to be granted a remedy in a timely manner. In short, 
introducing this binding human rights obligation overcomplicates the task of 
allocating responsibility for the right to water when water supply services have 
been privatized and are operated by foreign investors.
5 Conclusion
The process of privatization produces a variety of interactions between public 
and private interests. In the context of water supply and sanitation services, 
understandings of public and private focus on the actors involved, how water 
120 See d’Aspremont, Nollkaemper, Plakokefalos and Ryngaert, supra note 102, p. 59; André 
Nollkaemper, ‘Concerted Adjudication in Cases of Shared Responsibility’, New York Uni-
versity Journal of International Law and Politics, 46/3: 809–847 (2014).
121 cescr, General Comment No. 15, supra note 6, para. 55.
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should be distributed and how public and private interests are protected by 
the law. These frames of reference assist in analyzing the reasoning of the tri-
bunal in the Urbaser award. When considering Argentina’s counterclaim, the 
tribunal in Urbaser merged public and private interests when addressing the 
obligation to respect the right to water. In contrast, when examining the duty 
to protect the right to water, the tribunal clearly separated these three concep-
tions of public and private. The result of this approach is that, in relation to the 
obligation to respect the right to water, both States and foreign investors can be 
held responsible under international law. The international duty to protect the 
right to water remains solely an obligation of the State.
Creating differentiated responsibilities between States and non-State ac-
tors by drawing upon the respect, protect and fulfil framework in this manner 
does not align with its intended purpose. Further, the respect, protect and fulfil 
framework lacks sufficient clarity to perform this function. Additional compli-
cations arise when trying to hold a foreign investor responsible in the State-
based human rights framework. In particular, rights holders face challenges 
identifying an appropriate forum for the claim, determining on what basis for-
eign investors are to be held responsible and addressing how issues of shared 
responsibility and dual liability should be co-ordinated. As a result, the right to 
water becomes vulnerable to legal manoeuvring by those seeking to avoid or 
minimise liability. These factors combine to reduce the chances of rights hold-
ers being able to access a prompt and effective remedy for any violations of the 
right to water, which undermines the significance of the right.
In sum, for those seeking to impose international responsibilities on cor-
porate bodies for human rights abuses, the Urbaser award may initially ap-
pear to be a step in the right direction. However, by attempting to introduce 
liability for non-State actors within the State-based respect, protect and fulfil 
framework, the tribunal has blurred boundaries that the human rights regime 
cannot accommodate at present. Therefore, either international human rights 
must be solely viewed as State obligations that encompass the duties to re-
spect, protect and fulfil, or alternatively, a new human rights structure needs 
to be adopted to accommodate non-State actors. The Urbaser award sits un-
comfortably between these models and, as a result, confuses the allocation of 
responsibility for the human right to water. Thus, any symbolic value associ-
ated with the Urbaser award being the first to create binding human rights 
obligations for foreign investors is tainted by the legal uncertainty that results.
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